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THE ERA OF LIBERTARIAN REPRESSION-
1948 TO 1973:
From Congressman to President, With Substantial
Support from the Liberal Establishment
By FRANK WILKINSON*
P RIOR TO WATERGATE and its subsequent revelations of ex delicto actions
and domestic intelligence decisions,' the nation had taken several long
strides down the road toward a police state through the enactment of
repressive laws. The law and order responses to the problems of our time
on the part of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell Administration and the majority
of Congress, caused one of our foremost historians to characterize the
trend as portending the dissolution of the Republic.2 In reference to
the overwhelming-in some instances unanimous-votes in the Congress
for these law and order measures, another historian has speculated that
"we might be the first people to go fascist by the democratic vote."'3
The resulting repression of civil liberties from this law and order
legislation which we have experienced in the past five years, is qualitatively
different in both cause and scope from the attacks on the Bill of Rights
following World War II and continuing into the McCarthy Era. In both
periods, the repressive laws (and/or Executive Orders) were partially
by-products of the political manipulation of public fears. In the earlier
McCarthy era the manipulated fear was communism, both domestic and
foreign. While the record is still far from complete, an increasing number
of scholars is finding that the fears were more myth than fact; in many
instances, deliberate and fabricated hoaxes; and, at most, ephemeral.
Such is not the case today. Crime, the modern fear, whether street
or organized, is real and is increasing. Year after year, according to the
understatements available 4 on the problem from the FBI's Uniform Crime
Reports, crime has increased-both in actual number committed and in
proportion to the population growth. The political manipulation of
the public's well-founded fear of crime in the present era has taken
* A.B., University of California, Los Angeles; Executive Director, NATIONAL COM-
MrrrEE AGAINST REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION.
1 Top Secret Decision Memorandum, The White House, July 15, 1970, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1973, at 36, col. 5.
2 Commager, Is Freedom Dying in America? LOOK MAGAZINE, July 14, 1970, p. 16.
3 Press Conference by William L. Shirer (in reference to address before Californians
for Liberal Representation and release of book THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH quoted
in Houston, U.S. Future: Legal Dictatorship? Los Angeles Times, March 13, 1970).
4 FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS [hereinafter cited as
UCRI, Index of Crime, Table II, at 61 (1972); Law and Order Four Years Later,
NEw REPUBLIC, September 23, 1973, at 5-9 [hereinafter cited as Law and Order].
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rhetorical form in the political appeals for law and order during the
1968, 1970, and 1972 national campaigns, resulting in overwhelming
and bi-partisan Congressional approval of ill-conceived and patently
repressive laws in 1968 and 1970.5
Following a pre-1972 election speech for the Nixon-Agnew ticket,
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst received headlines proclaiming
"Kleindienst Sees Era of Decreasing Crime."' 6 A nonanalytical examina-
tion of his talk to the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce that day would
lead the listener to conclude that crime was up only 1% to date in 1972,
compared with a 17% rise in 1968. Further, he credited the success in
part to the fact that, unlike his predecessor, Ramsey Clark, who refused
wiretapping as an instrument of law enforcement, "Mr. Nixon's first steps
in office were to direct the attorney general to use court-authorized
wiretaps where appropriate in cases involving organized crime."
7
On October 15th, President Nixon in a national broadcast declared
that he had brought the "frightening trend of crime and anarchy" to a
standstill. He cited, again, the 1% increase to that point in 1972, but
juxtaposed this against his charge that "serious crimes had risen by 122%
in the eight years" before he took office.
8
However, at the time of this broadcast in 1972, the facts as to
Mr. Nixon's first three years in office were readily available by way of the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports released in August. In response to
the alleged war on crime, the figures clearly indicated that crime rates had
not been reversed, nor stabilized, but had increased in each of the seven
categories covered by the UCR. 9 The President's campaign statement of
progress was regrettably misleading because of his omission of statistics
for 1969 through 1971. Not only did Mr. Nixon fail to mention to his
radio listeners that crime had actually risen by 38% in his first three years
in office,' 0 but he engaged in the same statistical legerdemain that the
Justice Department had initiated the preceding year, claiming that
the corner on crime had been turned inasmuch as "the rate of increase
[crime] has decreased."" In addition, noting that in 1968 it had been
necessary for him to describe the District of Columbia as the "crime
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq. (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 841 et seq. (1970); 18
U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1968); 18 U.S.C. 88 1961 et seq. (1970); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101,
2102 (1968); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1968); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575 et seq. (1970);
18 U.S.C. § 6001 etseq. (1970); 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 etseq. (1970).
6 Kendall, Klelndienst Sees Era of Decreasing Crime, Los Angeles Times, September
29, 1972.
7 ld.
8 Semple, Nixon Says He Kept Vow to Check Rise in Crime, N.Y. Times, October
16, 1972, at 32, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Semple].
9 Law and Order, note 5 supra, at 5-6.
10 Compare UCR (1969) at 57 with UCR (1970) at 65 and UCR (1971) at 61.
11 Law and Order, note 5 supra, at 6.
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capital of the world," he proceeded to cite favorable statistics as of 1972,
claiming a 50% drop in crime in the nation's Capital. However, again,
readily available facts at the time from the Brookings Institute and
others, reported that the statistics indicating a decline in serious crime in
Washington stemmed primarily from the fact that the D.C. police had
downgraded the value of some stolen items, thereby eliminating a number
of larcenies and burglaries from the statistics."
The known facts regarding the measurable effect of the 1968 and
1970 law and order statutes in controlling crime will be discussed below.
But in summation at this point, those inclined toward acceptance of the
constitutional restrictions contained in the additions to the Criminal Code
in 1968 and 1970, as the necessary and effective means to resolve the
crime problem, would do well to think about the non-manipulated record:
14 million more property crimes and over 2 million violent crimes in
the first three years following the inauguration of what was proclaimed
to be a law and order administration."3
Of greater importance in distinguishing the quality and scope of civil
liberties repression during the McCarthy era and the present epoch, has
been the development of coordinate repression by the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of our federal government; and, the corollary
breakdown of the "checks and balances" protection inherent within the
doctrine of the separation of powers. In the Fifties, the Congress was as
subservient to the political manipulation of the fear of communism, as the
Congress in 1970 was to the real issue of crime. But, unlike President
Nixon, the prolocutor of the law and order forces, Truman and then
Eisenhower, who both initiated and enforced repressive laws and Executive
Orders,14 did on notable occasions strike stands for civil liberty.15 In
addition, the United States Supreme Court, especially in the darkest days
of the McCarthy witch hunts-between 1954 and 1957, rendered numer-
ous decisions' 6 of historic importance for civil rights and liberties, to aid
12 Semple, note 9 supra.
13 UCR (1971), note 5 supra, at 61 (Property crimes: 14,390,000; Violent crimes:
2,199,480). See also UCR (1972) at 61 (if data are added for 1972, respective four-
year totals are 19,453,900 and 3,027,630).
14 Compare Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1943-1948 Comp.) (Truman) with
Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1948-1953 Comp.) (Eisenhower) and Exec.
Order No. 10865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959-1963 Comp.) (Eisenhower). See also The Smith
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1940); The Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64
Stat. 987 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.) (Both Truman and
Eisenhower prosecuted under these two acts).
15 Veto message from President Truman to the House of Representatives, September
22, 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CoNo. REc. 15629 (1950) [Vetoing H.R. 9490, the
proposed Internal Security Act of 1950, later passed over Truman's veto].
16 See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
[Vol. 7:2
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in turning the tide against racism and reaction. That is not to say, as the
author well knows, 17 that the High Court's holdings against the anti-civil
liberties forces was altogether consistent. The demonstrable point is that
at least one of the separate branches, and occasionally two, did effectively
check the illiberal acts of the Congress in that period.
As to the present period, our civil liberties in general are threatened
by all components of the federal government. First by a Congress, which
has failed to safeguard its own authority and has yielded to the Executive's
demagogic exploitation of the peoples' fears and frustrations on the crime
issue, has enacted a series of statutes which jeopardize individual freedom,
and which has had little or no effect in curbing criminal actions.'
8
Secondly by a President, who has been labeled the most repressive, and
politically deceptive within memory of living Americans.
9 And finally, a
Supreme Court, which this layman sees charted on a collision course with
the Bill of Rights; under the euphemism of "strict construction.,
20 A
17 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
18 Supra note 14.
19 Address by Congressional Black Caucus, State of the Union Message, January 31,
1973, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONe. Rac, H625 et seq.
20 Semple, note 9 supra,
Winter, 1974]
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court which, with granted and notable exceptions, 2' has rendered in the1971 and 1972 terms well over twoscore decisions which erode, inter
alia, basic first amendment and due process clauses, not only of the
21 It is recognized that only a small proportion of the United States Supreme Courtdecisions are of significance to civil libertarians. For example, Melvin L. Wulf, Esq.,Staff Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter referred to asACLU] cites only 22 of the 143 full opinion decisions in the 1971 Term of the Courtwhich he viewed as "significant" to the ACLU. Civil Liberties, October, 1972. Theauthor cites "notable exceptions to the collision course." See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973) (held Texas anti-abortion law unconstitutional); Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding capital punishment to be unconstitutional, as applied);Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (extended first amendment protection to S.D.S.Chapter denied college recognition); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972)(denied use of wiretapped information as a basis for interrogating federal grand jurywitnesses); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (heldunconstitutional government's assertion of domestic warrantless wiretaps); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to counsel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405U.S. 330 (1972) (reduced one-year residence requirement to thirty days, for voterregistration); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (eliminated sex discrimination fromqualification to serve as administrator of an estate). However the author cites manydecisions as erosions of prior Court holdings in the area of civil liberties. See, e.g.,Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (allowing the taking of fingernail dirt withoutwarrant and over protest); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,411 U.S. 1 (1973) (disparate financial resources of rich and poor school districts donot violate Equal Protection Clause of fourteenth amendment); United States v.Dionisia, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (fifth amendment protections do not apply on taking ofvoice or handwriting samples); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (in effect,
making criminals of all persons who in any way disseminate any material describingsexual intercourse or depicting nudity); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)(denial of visa to Belgian journalist and Marxist to participate in academic confer-ences, based on application of McCarthy Era statute); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.655 (1972) (requiring reporters to reveal confidential sources in grand jury proceed-ings); United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (following Branzburg); Gravelv. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (limiting application of Speech and DebateClause to the aides of United States Senators); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)(dilution of citizen's right to sue government for first amendment violating surveil-lances unless tangible injury can be shown); Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.551 (1972) (allowing privately owned shopping centers to prohibit the peacefuldistribution of political material on their premises); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that Pennsylvania's state liquor laws do not constitutesufficient state involvement to invoke fourteenth amendment's prohibition against
racial discrimination); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (informer's tip held tobe reasonable grounds for a forceable stop and frisk); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682(1972) (no counsel required at lineup prior to indictment); Kastigar v. United States,406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding "use" immunity); Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404(1972) (reading sixth amendment as not requiring unanimous jury verdicts with 10to 2 verdicts in Oregon); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (like Apodoca,reading sixth amendment as not requiring unanimous jury verdicts upholding 9 to 3verdicts in Louisiana); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) (upholding Massa-chusetts loyalty oath); Ham v. South Carolina, 404 U.S. 1057 (1971) (denial of voirdire regarding potential juror's prejudice against beards); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.477 (1972) (allowing "preponderance of evidence" as against the tougher "beyond a
reasonable doubt," in determining voluntary nature of confessions); Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement procured without warning of fifth amendmentrights is admissible to impeach accused at trial); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971) (limitation on Dombrowski rule to enjoin state violations of first amendment);Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare recipient may not r.fus 1 wgrrantlcss
bom9 visit without risking termiqqtion of benefits),
AKRON LAW R~vimw [Vol. 7:2
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liberal momentum established under the Warren Court, but of High Court
decisions dating back more than eighty years.2
Before addressing this paper to those sections of the recently enacted
criminal statutes and pending legislation which are deemed to be
repressive, it is essential to review in some detail the legislative history
and subsequent enforcement of comparable legislation enacted 25 years
ago. Optimistic talk about repealing the law and order statutes of 1968
and 1970 is quickly tempered by such study. However, it may serve
to motivate timely political concern sufficient to abort Congressional
approval of the even more repressive pending legislation.
23
Herein considered is the legislative history, adjudication, and political
action efforts directed at repeal, of the Internal Security Act 
of 1950.24
The political personalities responsible for this measure played similar roles
in the enactment of the recent anti-civil liberties laws in 1968 and 1970.
Twenty-five years ago, in 1948, then Representative Richard Nixon
was chairman of the subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-Amer-
ican Activities (HUAC), responsible for reporting out what was then
called the Mundt-Nixon bill.25 For the first time in the nation's history, the
Nixon measure compelled the registration of a political party (the
Communist Party), its members, and a vaguely defined organizational
category called "Communist-Fronts." As existing law
2 6 made it a crime to
attempt to establish a "totalitarian dictatorship" (and the bill made a
finding of fact that the Communist Party was trying to do exactly that),
his bill then required the Party and its members to register. Thus, on its
face it was seen in conflict with constitutional proscriptions against bills
of attainder. However, the bill was overwhelmingly approved27 by the
House in the hysterical atmosphere of the international and domestic
Cold War then underway. Senate hearings were held a month later, but
failed to act on the controversial proposal.
As the Anti-Communist hysteria mounted, particularly after the
outbreak of Korean hostilities, the next Congress revived interest in
the Mundt-Nixon proposal. Sensing a pre-election stampede, President
Truman-who must himself be credited with initiating many of the
repressive measures associated with the Cold War,
2 had his second
22Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1971) with Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
23 See pp. 302-309 inira.
24The Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.).
25 H.R. 7595, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
2618 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1940); 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1940).
2 H.. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CoNo. Rac. 6149 (1948).
28 See, e.g., Exec, Order No, 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
Winter, 1974]
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thought on the nation's anti-civil liberties trend and tried in early August,
1950, to ward off the threatening legislation, declaring: "Some of theproposed measures would, in effect, impose severe penalties for normal
political activities on the part of certain groups, including Communists....
This kind of legislation is unnecessary, ineffective and dangerous." 29 His
words went unheeded not only by the pro-Nixon forces in the House
and Senate, but were almost immediately followed by what can only
be described as the paradigm of liberal capitulation.
In the Senate, the freshman Senator from Minnesota, Hubert
Humphrey, in concert with six 30 of his colleagues-led by Senator Kilgore
of West Virginia, proposed as a substitute for Nixon's "registration"
proposal, the ultimate weapon of repression: concentration camps to
intern potential troublemakers on the occasion of some loosely defined
future "Internal Security Emergency. 31 The Senate rejected the motion
as a "substitute," but cheerfully tacked it on as an amendment to the
Mundt-Nixon "registration" scheme 3 ---with only 7 Senators and 1
Representative in opposition.
When Truman subsequently vetoed the combined measures, citing
support from the Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, and the
C.I.A., Humphrey reversed his field and voted against the bill; but the evil
seed he and other liberals had planted, flourished, and the veto was
overridden. 33 Lest the impression be given that Humphrey suddenly
reverted to "religious instinct"3 4 or belatedly "came clean.. . to rectify
the miserable mistake" one need only study the full record. "Because
I felt that it was most important that we have some kind of anti-
29 Message from President Truman to Congress of United States, H.R. Doc. No. 679,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REC. 12020 (1950).
30 Senator Humphrey was joined by Senators Benton, Douglas, Graham, Kefauver,
Kilgore, and Lehman.
31 Emergency Detention Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Tit. II, 64 Stat. 1019. Section 102 of
this Act states:
(a) In the event of any one of the following:(1) Invasion of the territory of the United States or its possessions,(2) Declaration of war by Congress, or(3) Insurrection within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy,and if, upon the occurrence of one or more of the above, the President shallfind that the proclamation of an emergency pursuant to this section is essentialto the preservation, protection and defense of the Constitution, and to thecommon defense and safety of the territory and people of the United States, thePresident is authorized to make public proclamation of the existence of an
"Internal Security Emergency."(b) A state of "Internal Security Emergency" (hereinafter referred to asthe "emergency") so declared shall continue in existence until terminated byproclamation of the President or by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
32 96 CONG. REc. 14599-606, 14621-28 (1950).
33 The House passed the Bill 286 to 48. 96 CONG. REc. 15632-33 (1950). The Senate
passed the Bill 57 to 10. Id. at 15726.
34 96 CONG. REC. 15526 (1950).
35 Id. at 15525-6,
AYRON LAw R~vrmw [Vol. 7:2
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communist legislation," he rationalized his earlier vote, "I swallowed my
feelings of frustration and of despair about some of the inequities of the
bill and cast a vote 'yea.'" But far from retreating from his concentration
camp proposal, his aim focused on the solicitude on the part of so-called
anti-communists on the House-Senate conference committee, whom he
complained brought "back a weaker bill, not a bill to strike stronger blows
at the Communist menace, but weaker blows," whereby those interned in
the detention centers to be established under the proposal would have "the
right of habeas corpus so they can be released and go on to do their
dirty business."136 Such was the political morality of the dissenters, as
Congress approved its most repressive law to that time-a quarter
century ago. And, thus the nation obtained Title I of the Internal
Security Act of 1950-the compulsory "registration" of the unorthodox-
from Richard Nixon, and, Title II-the euphemistically characterized
"detention" camps-from Hubert Humphrey.
The point here, however, is not the fact that the law was passed, and
later expanded.3 Rather, that once such hysteria-sponsored measures do
become law, it becomes an all but impossible task for the people to redress
their grievance and secure repeal. This is the message of reality for this
generation, confronted as it is now by the enactment of the repressive law
and order statutes of 1968 and 1970, and, the pendency of what is
here deemed to be the most repressive of all legislation-the so-called
"Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973," as currently proposed by the
Nixon Administration.
For the next decade and a half, the "registration" provisions of the
Internal Security Act 38 served as the primary threat to the right of dissent,
casting its pale of fear far beyond those selected as its initial targets.
President Truman named the 5-man Subversive Activities Control Board
(SACB), the administrative agency under the law, within 30 days of the
time that his veto was overridden.39 A month later the Attorney General
filed a petition with the Board to compel the Communist Party to register
as a "Communist action organization" and, the track-down was officially
under way. Additional petitions against "Communist-front organizations"
36 Id. at 15520-1.
37 The Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 was expanded by the 83d
Congress to include The Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, Tit. III, 68 Stat.
775 (1954).
38 An exhaustive analysis of the Internal Security Act as originally passed may be
found in Note, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 606 (1951).
See also Chafee, The Registration of "Communist Front" Organizations in the
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 63 HAsv. L. REv. 1382 (1950); Note, The Registration of
Communist Front Organizations: The Statutory Framework and the Constitutional
Issue, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1270 (1965).
39 President Truman gave recess appointments to the original five members of the
SUBvERSrVE AcTrvrrrms CoNmRoL BoARD [hereinafter referred to as SACBI on October
23, 1950. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1950, at 1, col. 1.
Winter, 1974]
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were filed in the fiscal years ending June, 1954, 40 1955,41 and 1956.42
And, after an elapse of 12 years from the time Congress enacted the
law, proceedings were initiated to compel the first ten individuals to
register as "members of a Communist-action organization." The cost
to the directly affected organizations and individuals was staggering.
43
However, the chilling effect on the right of association of all citizens was
unquestionably greater. From the outset, many organizations established
their own "do-it-yourself" loyalty screenings of their membership, and
the number of individuals who subsequently decided to join no
organizations at all was beyond measure."
As President Truman had predicted in his veto message, the Act was
subjected to massive legal challenge. 45 It was not until 1961, after 11
years of near continuous hearings and litigation, that a sharply divided
Supreme Court upheld the SACB's built-in finding that the U.S.
Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," and, therefore,
should proceed to register as prescribed the Act.46 Three of the dissenting
Justices 47 argued in effect that the decision was an exercise in futility,
inasmuch as the act of compulsory registration, under existing law, would
be self-incriminating, and thereby the Act itself was an unconstitutional
"violation of the Fifth Amendment," 4-a position soon to be sustained
4o SACB 4th ANNUAL REP. at 7 (1954)).(American Committee for Protection of Foreign
Born; American Slav Congress; Civil Rights Congress; Committee for a Democratic
Far Eastern Policy; Council on African Affairs, Inc.; International Workers Order,
Inc.; Jefferson School of Social Science; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee; Labor
Youth League; National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.; United May
Day Committee, and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade).
41 SACB 5th ANNUAL REP. at 10 (1955). (Washington Pension Union and California
Labor School).
42 SACB 6th AJNuAL REP. at 8 (1956). (American Peace Crusade; National Negro
Labor Council; International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers of America,
and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. For a chart of
completed and active cases from 1950 to 1956 see page 10.
43 David Jenkins, Defense Coordinator for the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union,
estimated that the union expended $800,000 on litigation and related costs between
1955 and 1966.
44 U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 22, 1950, at 20, Vol. 29.
45 E.g., From the moment the Attorney General filed his initial petition against the
Communist Party on November 22, 1950, suit was filed to enjoin the Board from
proceeding. The stay was ultimately denied by the Supreme Court. Communist Party
of the United States v. McGrath, 340 U.S. 950 (1951). Hearings soon thereafter
began before the Board, and 15,000 pages of testimony and 507 documentary exhibits
were received. In 1956 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the ruling of the
Court of Appeals for D.C. upholding registration under the Act. Communist Party of
the United States v. SACB, 351 U.S. 115 (1956). Over 9 years after enactment, the
case worked its way back up to the Supreme Court. 361 U.S. 951 (1960).
46 Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961). This was a
5 to 4 decision with Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas
dissenting.
47 Warren, C.J.; Douglas, Brennan, JJ.
48 367 U.S. at 137, 188-90, 200-02.
[Vol. 7:2
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by a unanimous Court.49 Justice Black, alone, read the entire Act as a
patent violation of the first amendment.
50
The majority, however, had a poignant message for those who would
abdicate the prime responsibility of Congress and disallow the enactment
of repressive law, from the outset-whether in 1948-50 or 1968-70.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded the
112-page decision by stating: "[w]e must decline to enter into discussion
of the wisdom of this legislation." 5 1 Further, in reference to the 35-year
record of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 52 the Court
majority offered the admonitory notice:
The purpose of the Subversive Activities Control Act is said to be to
prevent the world-wide Communist conspiracy from accomplishing
its purpose in this country. It is not for the courts to reexamine the
validity of these legislative findings and reject them. They are
the product of extensive investigation by Committees of Congress
over more than a decade and a half. We certainly cannot dismiss
them as unfounded or irrational imaginings.
53
With the exception of this single, pro forma, and temporary victory,
the government's multiple prosecutions under the Act, dissipated during
the mid-'60s. Almost $6 million in operating costs for the SACB, and
unreported millions for litigation costs for the staff of attorneys within
the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, were expended
in a futile effort to enforce an unenforceable law.54 In summary, not one
"subversive organization-'action,' 'front,' or 'infiltrated'-harkened to
the registration" call. The Act drowned in the calm of an all-protecting
fifth amendment sea. As the United States Chamber of Commerce
wistfully editorialized against the SACB in October, 1967:
After all, in its 17-year life it never controlled a subversive. It never
has accomplished anything at all. This witch hunt had a fast start
and a short life. The Act of Congress establishing it was so full of
49Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). Mr. Justice White took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
50 367 U.S. at 137 where Mr. Justice Black states:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas
we cherish. The first banning of an association because it advocates hated
ideas-whether that association be called a political party or not-marks a
fateful moment in the history of a free country. That moment seems to have
arrived for this country.
51367 U.S. at 115 [emphasis added].
52HUAC was founded as a Temporary Committee of the House in 1938 and
established as a Standing Committee on Jan. 3, 1945.
53 367 U.S. at 94, 95 [emphasis added]. See also n.37 at 94 where the Court cites 17
reports on hearings before House Committees.
54 117 CoNe. REC. 25889 (1971).
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fault, principally in its violations of the Constitution, that the Board
soon became inoperable.n
With the Supreme Court's landmark decision of November 15, 1965,
which held the Act to be unenforceable insofar as the registration of
alleged individual members of the Communist Party,56 the SACB was all
out dead. Further, the political climate in the country might have permitted
an orderly burial. No longer was the Court divided on the constitutional
questions of the domestic Cold War; the decision was unanimous.57
Furthermore, the chief critics of the Warren Court in years
past found Jeffersonian words with which to praise the Court for its
defense of the most unorthodox: Albertson and Proctor were not
mistakenly identified Communists, as had happened so frequently in
the preceding era; both were avowed members and leaders of the
Party. In this context, note Senator Barry Goldwater's comment two
weeks after the Albertson decision:
Without softening for a moment any of my past and current
criticisms of the court, I applaud it wholeheartedly in this instance
... it would be worse than irritating if a basic protection of our
freedom were thrown out the window simply to inconvenience
the Communist Party.5
He was even preceded by an editorial by William F. Knowland in
the Oakland Tribune on the day following the decision stating: "Before
any one should start hurling charges at the Court, he should first
remember he too has the same constitutional guarantee, and that if
an exception was made once-it could be made again and again and,
one day, he might not have the protection of the Constitution." 59 It
is significant to note that these remarks are directed towards the only
Nixon-sponsored law to that time.
In spite of the Supreme Court and surrounding supporters, the then
discredited HUAC had moved as only HUAC could, to prepare new
legislation to nullify several decisions of the courts, and revive the
SACB. 60 Despite the serious constitutional questions involved in circum-
venting the several recent decisions of the courts, the late Senator
Dirksen, with cooperation from Mississippi's Senator James 0. Eastland,
pressured a divided Senate Judiciary Committee into reporting out his
HUAC-sponsored bill, without hearings of any kind, and without so much
as the customary elicitation of an opinion from the Attorney General and
55 NAION's Buslrmss, Oct. 1967, Vol. 55, at 42.
56 Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
57 Id. White, J., not participating.
58 N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1965, at 33, col. 6.
59 Oakland Tribune, Nov. 16, 1965.
60 SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Sept. 24, 1966, at 59.
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Justice Department.- On October 11, 1967, in the face of all facts here
recited, a cynical Senate in an acrimonious debate, marked by extreme
anti-Communist, anti-Warren Court speeches, voted to fund the SACB
with an additional $295,000 for fiscal 1967-68; and, having done so,
proceeded the following week to pass the Dirksen-HUAC bill-albeit with
a face-saving amendment of compromise with the opponents.
62 In a
gesture that resulted in bipartisan repression, Dirksen covered over the
recognized patronage motivations behind the measure in the climax of his
emotional appeal: "I have had several discussions with the President of the
United States on this matter," he pressed, and "He would like to see this
bill passed and see this Board [the SACB] go back into action."
'
The House action was more expedient. The entire HUAC package
was overwhelmingly approved, and economy minded Republicans who
had introduced bills for outright repeal went down to defeat.64 Subse-
quently, the House-Senate Conference Committee accepted the far more
comprehensive HUAC version, qualified only by the Senate amendment-
which provided for the termination of the SACB if no proceedings were
undertaken under the revised law in 1968.65
For the grand finale of this year of Congressional contempt for our
liberties, in the closing hours of the 1st Session, on December 14th, the
Senate met to decide on the many additions to the bill accepted by their
conferees, but which had never been subjected to Senate debate.
Ironically, they met just three days after the Supreme Court had driven
one more nail into the coffin of the original 1950 Act.66 As their vote that
day included the reaffirmation of that section of the law prohibiting
61 On all pending legislation, especially amendments to existing law that has been
subject to judicial interpretation, it has been the policy to solicit the opinion of the
Justice Department.
62 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 81 Stat. 765 (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 50 U.S.C.) (1968), amending 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1950). The Mansfield-
Dirksen-Proxmire Amendment provides that the SACB shall cease to exist on June
30, 1969, unless a proceeding shall have been instituted by the Attorney General, and
a hearing conducted by the SACB during 1968. If the Attorney General does not
institute a proceeding before the SACB, he is required to report to the Congress
before June 30, 1968, stating his reasons for not having done so; similar provisions
are provided in regard to a hearing by the SACB.
63 113 CONG. REc. 28375 (1967). In addition Dirksen remarked: "I ask who wants
this? I am pretty confident that the President of the United States wants it." 113
CONG. Rac. 28514 (1967).
64 HUAC's bill was H.R. 12601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). On July 24, 1967, Rep.
Anderson (Ill.) and Rep. Gubser (Cal.) introduced H.R. 11675 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) and H.R. 11678 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) to abolish the SACB. Their bills
died in the Committee to which they were referred, HUAC. For a dissenting view by
Rep. John Culver see H.R.-S. Rep. No. 1038, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967).
65 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 81 Stat. 765 (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 50 U.S.C.) (1967), amending 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1950).
66 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); see Gunther, Reflections on Robel-
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employment in "defense" facilities of alleged "Communist-action"
members, and, was thereby in direct contradiction with the Court's most
recent holding, it is significant to note the Court's language. Chief Justice
Warren declared that this Title of the Act:6 7
Is an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association
protected by the first amendment... It would indeed be ironic
if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion
of one of those liberties-the freedom of association-which makes
the defense of the Nation worthwhile.... The Statute quite literally
establishes guilt by association . . . The inhibiting effect on the
exercise of first amendment rights is clear.68
With this profound stricture upon the actions of the earlier 81st
Congress spread across the news and editorial columns of the nation's
press, the Senate convened that day and "approved" the full HUAC-
Dirksen bill-thereby breathing new life into the dead body.69
It is a little hard to see how there could have been much doubt
as to the outcome in the mind of the presiding officer... For there
were only five Senators in the chamber... Thus by the margin of
one vote out of a grand total of five the ayes had it, giving the
do-nothing SACB in effect nothing to do, with pay... Which is, in
the words of an old expression, nice work if you can get it.70
The President affixed his signature on January 2, 1968, making the
rebirth official.71
The above narrative illustrates the non-democratic setting of the
enactment. Nevertheless the record of the perfidious implementation of
the resuscitated Act continues. In 1968, at the eleventh hour, a reluctant
Ramsey Clark72 filed the life-saving petition, as required by the Senate
compromise. The target: a fifth-generation Utah Mormon and 21
additional alleged "action" group members. There had been a problem
locating suitable test cases which had not been tainted by illegal
government wiretapping.3 In short order, the Court of Appeals disposed
67 Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1950).
68 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 261, 264, 265 (1967).
69 On October 23, 1967, when the Senate voted for the Mansfield-Dirksen-Proxmire
Amendment, the vote was 65 to 10; 113 CoNG. REc. 29722-29723 (1967).
70 113 CONG. Rac. 36762 (1967); The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1967 at 6, col. 1.
7 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 81 Stat. 765 (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 50 U.S.C.) (1967), amending 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1950).
72 July 1, 1968; see supra, note 62.
7 The Supreme Court in Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968), reargued sub
nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), by holding and dicta implied
that all cases with warrantless wiretaps will have special fourth amendment exclu-
sionary protection. The government's position was contradictory, as Attorney General
Ramsey Clark agreed with the Court's implied protections; however, the picture
changed with the enactment of the wiretapping section of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (1968).
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of these,74 holding the relevant sections of the revised Act to be "contrary
to the First Amendment"; and, the new Burger Court denied certiorari
on April 20, 1970.'0
In 1971, the Senate at last moved to cut off further appropriations
for the Board. As the annual appropriation moved toward the Senate
floor that summer, President Nixon took unprecedented executive action
to accomplish by fiat that which the Congress was clearly unwilling to do
by legislative action. Namely, provide the second-time-dead SACB with
something to do.76 Angered by this violation of Congressional perogative,
a bipartisan coalition, including Mr. Nixon's own Minority Leader,
7 7
voted to deny funding to implement the President's Executive Order.
However, led by the House Committee on Internal Security (HISC) 78
which had won House approval on a bill ratifying Mr. Nixon's Order and
granting the necessary authority for compulsory processes for his purpose,
a stalemate between the two houses developed. A Conference Report
which agreed to continue funding, without any new authority to act, later
carried in the Senate by a margin of just two votes.
79
By 1972, while the House was still subject to the continuing influence
of HISC's several moves to rename or substitute some form of replace-
ment for the SACB, an adamant Senate voted against any funding or new
powers whatsoever for the Board, although as yet no one was prepared to
repeal the Act. As a result, a "compromise" was agreed to, singularly
fitting for the Watergate summer of 1972. It was agreed that the SACB
should receive enough money to pay its members their $36,000 for
1972-73, plus rent and entourage, but with the stipulation that they would
not perform any function whatsoever. Senator Ervin quipped at the time:
"let us not go through the mockery of doing nothing but drawing
salaries and breath." 8
With the opening of the 93rd Congress, the man who started it all
25 years ago, threw in the sponge. In submitting his budget for the
upcoming year, Richard Nixon wrote the appropriate obituary, and left
74Boorda v. SACB, 421 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1042(1969).
75 Id.
76 Exec. Order No. 11605, 36 Fed. Reg. 12831 (1971).
77117 CONG. REc. 25874, 25887, 25898, 28854, 29031 (1971).
78 This refers to two HISC-sponsored bills. The first, H.R 9669, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), ratified President Nixon's Executive Order 11605, supra note 77. The second
H.R. 11120, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) would have changed the name of SACB to
the Federal Employee Security and Appeals Commission (FESAC) and expand its
duties.
79 117 CONG. REc. 29053 (1971).
80 118 CONG. REc. S9507 (daily ed. June 15, 1972).
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the isolated HISC plot to its own "loyalty-security" intrigues.81 In the
place where next year's budget for SACB should have been, the President
inserted a series of little dashes.82
Concomitant with the budget slash, Francis J. McNamara, Executive
Secretary of the SACB, complained to a reporter: "Someone has to
determine what groups are 'subversive'. . . It bugs me when people come
in here with smug looks on their faces and suggest that anyone who still
thinks the Soviet Union is trying to take over the world is a stupid ass."8
But it was left for Senator Sam Ervin to say the last word. In a
colloquy with SACB supporter Senator Hruska of Nebraska, who
had suggested that a change of name might help, he imparted: "I say
to my good friend, the Senator from Nebraska, that it is said a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet, but a crushed gentian weed by
any other name would smell just as bad."8
Prior to this most recent death of the SACB, the repeal of the
concentration camp section of the Act, Title II-The Emergency
Detention Act of 1950, occurred on September 25, 1971, 21 years after
its enactment as an amendment to the Mundt-Nixon proposals, discussed
supra. The repeal vote was unanimous in the Senate, and by an over-
whelming 356 to 49 in the House-the one notable civil liberties response
to emanate from the Congress in these law and order years.8 5 For those
who question the power of redemption for original sin, it should be noted
that Hubert Humphrey was among the 200 Senators and Representatives
81 On June 20, 1973, HISC's Ichord and Preyer introduced H.R. 8865, to establish a
new Central Security Review office. H.R. 8865, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
82 President Nixon's Budget Message, 119 CONG. Rac. H513-519 (daily ed. January
29, 1973); Savings Expected to Be Made Through Reductions and Terminations in
Federal Programs in 3 Fiscal Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1973, at 83, col. 4.
"Subversive Activities Control Board: Terminated as a result of court decision limiting
workload...." Id.
83 Fredrickson, SACB Goes Out of Existence; Was Sponsored by Rep. Nixon-Agency
Bereft of Funds, Folds, Washington Post, July 1, 1973, at 84, col. 1.
84 Senator Ervin also remarked: "I cannot see that there is much that the members
can do during this fiscal year except to draw their breaths and their salaries." 118
CONG. REC. S17969 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972).
85117 CONG. REc. 31,781 (1971) (vote in the House): 117 CONG. REc. 32,145 (1971)
(vote in the Senate). Note: While the votes against appropriations for HUAC and
then HISC showed steady increase and nearly one-third of the House (133 members)
voted to recommit for public hearings the resolution to change the name of HUAC
on February 18, 1969, this was the first and only defeat to be suffered by the
Committee to that point in time. As in the SACB votes, the House consistently voted
in favor of continuing the Board, until the Senate finally checked it in 1972. On the
side of counter repression, Representatives have introduced many bills dealing with
the right of privacy in the past three years, but none of them moved out of commit-
tee; as an example, Representative John Conyers introduced H.R. 11567 to repeal the
Anti-Riot Act, on May 21, 1969, but no other member did so much as co-sponsor,
and, a similar bill has been introduced in this 93d Congress.
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who joined in co-sponsoring the repeal legislation.88 Further, Mr. Nixon
on two occasions dispatched Justice Department Internal Security Division
chiefs to testify that he was "unequivocally in favor of repealing" the Act.87
This strong desire for repeal was not concurred in by HUAC
(HISC) and the result came only after a long battle. In fact, without
HUAC's strident 1968 call for its application for the "temporary
imprisonment" of those involved in ghetto uprisings such as occurred in
Newark and Detroit in 1967, the Act might very well be on the books to
this day.88 While the general public was oblivious to the danger, this was
not so in the Black community. "I see a ghetto perhaps cordoned off into
a concentration camp," Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., told a Look
Magazine reporter six days before his assassination, "we face the danger
of a right-wing take-over, and eventually a Fascist society. ' s9 At that
time, Dr. King, Rap Brown of the Students' Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee, and other Black activists, were viewed as extremists on the
issue by other sections of the Black community. But within a day after
the release of HUAC's ominous report, the alarm became widespread.
For example, the conservative Washington Afro-American editorialized:
"Now an instrumentality of the legislative branch of the federal govern-
ment has admitted that in its sinister mind it is prepared to follow the
morally verminous route of Hitler's Germany by using concentration
camps in which to detain colored political militants."90
In terms of this paper's argument, it is essential to note that 18 years
elapsed after the enactment of the ultimate in repressive laws before
Congress took its first steps toward repeal of Title II, or even civil
86 Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii led the repeal forces in the Senate when,
without HISC, there was never vocal opposition. In the 91st Congress, he received
wide support for his repeal bill S1872, 115 CONo. REc. 9527 (1969). On February
4, 1971, he introduced the identical bill, 5592, 117 CONG. REc. 1656 (1971) and was
co-sponsored in his effort by 28 Senators, including Mr. Humphrey. In both instances
his legislation repealed Title II, but left intact the 15 "findings" of legislative necessity
which introduced the 1950 Act. The Senate later accepted the House repeal language,
as amended by its Judiciary Committee.
87H.R. REP. No. 92-94 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 10, 25 (1971); the representatives sent by
Mr. Nixon were Deputy Attorney General A. G. Yeagley, and Internal Security
Division Chief Robert C. Mardian.
88 HOUSE COMM. ON UN-AMERICAN AcTIrVITES, GUERRILLA WARFARE ADVOCATES IN
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong. 2d Session (1968). On page 59
of this report the following language appears and was given wide national publicity:
Conclusion... once the ghetto is sealed off... the following actions could be
taken by the authorities... (6) Acts of overt violence by the guerrillas would
mean that they had declared a "state of war" within the country and, therefore,
would forfeit their rights as in wartime. The McCarran Act [popular title of the
Internal Security Act of 1950, derived from the name of the Senate sponsor in
1950, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada] provides for various detention centers
to be operated throughout the country and these might well be utilized for the
temporary imprisonment of warring guerrillas.
89 America's Concentration Camps-The Rumors and the Realities, LooK, Vol. 32,
May 28, 1968, at 85.
90 Washington Afro-American, May 7, 1968 at 1, col. 1.
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liberties organizations attempted a formal legal challenge. 91 In the
intervening years, the government had appropriated the necessary funds92
and established six concentration camps throughout the country, on a
"standby" basis.93 Although the Department of Justice claimed that the
camps were abandoned in 1957, a New York-based civil liberties group
commissioned an investigative reporter who verified their status as of
1966. His report 94 confirmed by photographic evidence and direct
interviews that the camps, while utilized for alternative purposes,95 were
in fact readily available for use should the President make the necessary
findings 96 to trigger the application of the law.
Unique and primary credit for the political actions that led to the
repeal of the Act, belongs to the Japanese American Citizens League
(JACL), representing the only citizens who actually have experienced life
in American concentration camps.9 Following the provocative report by
HUAC, a graup of Nisei9 8 succeeded in establishing a "Committee to
Repeal the Emergency Detention Act," in the summer of 1968. After
three years and a wealth of practical experience in coping with HISC's
in-fighting, they led the nation to its first and only repeal of a repressive
law within the memory of living Americans. The victory did more than
simply expunge this part of the 1950 statute. Recognizing that the law did
not exist when President Roosevelt interned the Japanese-Americans in
1942, Republican Representative Thomas F. Railsback of Illinois success-
fully amended the repeal legislation to prevent any future President from
imprisoning any citizen "except pursuant to an Act of Congress."'
The repeal served other purposes as well. It represented the first
defeat ever sustained by the House Committee on Internal Security since
91 Bick v. Clark, Civil Doc. No. 2856-68 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1968). The author was
one of 16 plaintiffs in this suit, calling for nullification of Title II for its chilling
effect on first amendment rights of freedom of association. The case was dismissed
as moot on February 3, 1971.
92 $775,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, H.R. REP. No. 92-94, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 6 (1971).
93 Id. Florence, Arizona; Wickenburg, Arizona; Avon Park, Florida; Allenwood, Penn-
sylvania; El Reno, Oklahoma; Tule Lake, California.
94 Charles R. Allen, Jr., for Citizen's Committee for Constitutional Liberties.
95 E.g., the Allenwood, Pennsylvania, Camp is now used as a Minimum Security Prison
for Lewisburg Penitentiary.
96Supra, note 31.
97 On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt promulgated the orders establishing the
camps, Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942), Exec. Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R.
1124 (1942), whereby 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, approximately two-thirds
of whom were natural-born citizens of the United States, were removed from their
homes and placed in ten detention camps in several western states. Congress, by
enacting former § 97(a) of Title 18, U.S.C., "ratified" Exec. Order No. 9066 and all
further sanctions in 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1383 (1948). The Supreme Court had upheld
the orders in Hirabayash v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
98 Second generation Japanese Americans.
99 117 CONG. REc. 31,768 (1971).
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its establishment 35 years ago as the original HUAC.100 Additionally, two
entire years were lost before the campaign leadership, in and out of the
House, recognized the deceptive, delaying role played by HISC, and
transferred their efforts to the House Judiciary Committee. 101 Even then,
HISC fought to the end, trying to substitute legislation that would
perpetuate the concentration camp authority, and extend its applicability
to contemporary "movements" of protest.10 2 And, when the Committee
failed in a transparent effort to co-opt the JACL leadership into retaining
the law, by amending it to prevent detention of anyone because of
race, HISC resorted to its historical red-baiting theme.
103
CURRENT REPRESSION
It is from the perspective reality obtained by reviewing the above
record regarding repressive laws passed by Congress 25 years ago, that
citizens can best appreciate the long range damage wrought by the
enactment of the law and order statutes in 1968 and in 1970, and
the enormity of the task to secure their repeal. Therefore, while addressing
the principles and some of the already available practical arguments
necessary for an educational campaign directed toward ultimate repeal
of these recent repressive laws, it is the better part of wisdom to focus
attention toward the defeat of pending repressive legislation-the point
on which this paper concludes.
As exemplars of the repressive law and order statutes, the following
are selected for brief discussion: in 1968, the Anti-Riot Act' 04 and the
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance section of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; 105 in 1970, the "No Knock" and
"Preventive Detention" sections of the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970106 and the "Special Dangerous Offenders" and
100 Supra, note 85.
10191st Cong.: 115 CONG. REc. 80 (1969), 115 CONG. REc. 16,212 (1969); 92d
Cong.: 117 CONG. RC. 177 (1971). Bill referrals are made by the speaker, based on
the language of the legislation. In 1969, the repealers referred to "repeal of Title II
of the Internal Securities Act of 1950," and because HISC handles legislation re the
1950 Act, they were referred to HISC. In 1971, the repealers referred to "Amend-
ments of Title 18, United States Code," and were automatically referred to the
Judiciary Committee which handles such amendments. Note: Representative Mikva
and 22 others introduced H.R. 11373, which was identical to H.R. 234 in the 92d
Congress, but primary attention focused on the bills referred to HISC.
102H.R. 820, by HISC's Ichord and Ashbrook, 117 CoNG. REc. 190 (1971).
103 From its inception as HUAC in 1938, and continuing under its change in name to
HISC in 1969, these committees have engaged in the practice of describing their role
as opposition to "reds," Communists, etc., and alleging that their opponents to the
contrary support "reds," etc. This is generally what is meant by HUAC's and HISC's
"historic red-baiting theme."
104 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 2102 (1968).
105 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (1968).
106 23 D.C. Code §§ 23-522 ("No Knock"), 23-1322 ("Preventive Detention") (1970).
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"Use Immunity" sections of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.107
The primary argument against the Anti-Riot Act is that it is wholly
unnecessary. A full panoply of state and local laws was already available,
and fully enforced. In addition, the loose wording of the Act presented
serious infringements on the rights of peaceable assembly. Speakers
protesting conditions in ghetto areas, criticizing poverty or welfare
programs, or even addressing a hostile crowd, could find themselves
shortly afterwards charged with Federal crime. 08 The then Attorney
General Ramsey Clark warned against the Act's constitutional infirmities
and that "it will have very little impact" in controlling civil disorders. 08
Once enacted he refused to enforce it.
With the advent of the Nixon Administration, the Act became
one of the threatening tools to curb dissent. Assistant Attorney General
Will Wilson, who became the Justice Department's Chief Prosecutor
under John Mitchell, expressed the attitude of the Administration: "I'd
call something a riot sooner than maybe other people might. Don't you
think that's the attitude generally of this Administration?" '11 0 And, on
March 20, 1969, the Justice Department filed its first charges under the
Act in what has come to be called the Chicago Conspiracy.", Subse-
quently, it was applied against students in Seattle, demonstrating against
the manner in which Judge Julius Hoffman conducted the Chicago trial;
against students protesting the R.O.T.C. in St. Louis; against 67 occupants
and supporters at the confrontation at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, and
eight members and supporters of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War
in Gainesville, Florida, in connection with demonstrations at the time of
the 1972 Republican Convention. The best evidence that the Act has not
proven to be workable, even from the standpoint of the Administration, is
demonstrated by the fact the government has redrafted the 1968 statute
as part of its Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973.112
The most serious criticism against the application of the Anti-Riot
Act developed in the Seattle Liberation Front cases, M where a mistrial
occurred, and the government subsequently asked for and received
dismissal of the original indictments. 114 From the outset of this case, the
107 18 U.S.CA.. § 3561-3574 ("Special Dangerous Offender"), §§ 5001-5037 ("U.S.
Immunity") (1970).
108 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1971).
109 Emerson, Analysis of H.R. 421, 90th Congress, 1st Session, testimony in opposition
to H.R. 421 (1967).
110 113 CONG. REc. 19378 (1967).
II Reports THE ATLANTic, Vol. 223, May 1969.
U2 Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973, S. 1400, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. § 1801 (1973);
H.R. 6046, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. § 1801 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CCRA 1973].
113 United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1971) (appeal by defendants of
contempt citations after declaration of a mistrial at the trial level).
114 Seattle Times, March 27, 1973, at C7, coL 3.
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shocking role of undercover government agents provocateurs, who
admitted to numerous illegal actions in the course of entrapping the
defendants, aroused public concern." 5 It is argued that in order to prove
"intent" as defined under the law, as well as developing evidence to prove
conspiracy, the Anti-Riot Act invites just such illegal entrapments.
"For over 30 years, bills to relax the total ban on wiretapping
had been unsuccessfully introduced in each session of Congress."''
6 Then,
quite swiftly, a combination of Southern resentment against the Supreme
Court, together with decisions of the Court itself in 1967, which appeared
to inch toward limited eavesdropping, 1
7 provided rationale and political
muscle making possible the passage of the wiretapping legislation in the
law and order year of 1968.118 Prior to recent disclosures of wiretapping
not sanctioned under the Act, it has been all but impossible to rally public
concern in the civil liberties issues involved. In fact, reports of wiretapping
have been so widespread over such a long period that there was general
public confusion, if not a presumption of legality, be/ore the 1968 law
was passed. The legal argument against wiretapping (in regard to the all
but impossible problem of meeting fourth amendment demands for
specificity in the issuance of warrants, even where probable cause is
clearly indicated) is unfortunately, far too abstract to motivate public
actions for repeal. However, even more important than the revelations
surrounding United States v. United States District Court'
9 and the
Watergate argument for warrantless taps, in developing and focusing
public concern, is the data available from the reports of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. Regardless of how many tens of
thousands of conversations are tapped or bugged, legally or illegally, the
public's prime concern is, as always, results. However, from a civil
liberties standpoint, the one positive factor flowing from the 1968 Act
is the requirement that prosecutors and judges involved in authorizing
court-ordered wiretapping and bugging report annually on this surveil-
lance, setting forth the type of surveillance, where and how long it was
in operation, the crimes it was installed for, the number of people and
conversations, the cost, and, the amount of actual incriminating evidence
115 Cooper, Informant Tells of Supplying Explosives to Revolutionaries, L.A. Times,
March 27, 1973, at 1.
116 Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of Law and
Order, 67 MIcH. L. Rav. 455 & n.1 (1969).
117 Id. at 457-60; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
118 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1968).
19 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (electronic
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obtained, the causal relation between the arrest and the tap, and, above
all, the number of convictions resulted therefrom.20
While it is still too early to fully assess the results for definitive
conclusions, it is already demonstrably clear that in weighing the
immeasurable chilling effect upon free speech and association, as against
effective results in any true war against crime, wiretapping is neither
necessary nor effective. Through 1971, 77,227 people have been tapped
or bugged under the 1968 Act.'2 These have involved 1,118,912
conversations. 12 And, as a result 726 persons have been convicted; half
of which have involved gambling offenses.'23 While the rhetoric in support
of wiretapping claimed that it was necessary primarily for serious crimes
like homicide, kidnaping, and espionage, at the federal level in the first
three years, there has been only one device installed for kidnaping, and
none for either homicide or espionage. 124 These are the facts that should
cause the average citizen to stop, think, question, and take the first steps
toward repeal. Isn't it just possible that good old-fashioned police work
could have obtained the same evidence, secured the same convictions,
without the people wondering if their phones are tapped, or even
their bedrooms bugged?
In 1969, the Nixon Administration announced that it intended to
utilize the repressive laws enacted in 1968, notwithstanding that Attorney
General Ramsey Clark had refused to enforce them because of his belief
that they were not only unnecessary and ineffective, but patently unconsti-
tutional. Continuing further with the 1968 trend, the Administration in
1970 with strong bipartisan support pushed through its own law and order
legislative program. Enormous pressure was applied. But before it became
clear after the 1970 Congressional elections that a vote against law and
order was not political suicide, the pressure was frequently self-afflicted.
There were outstanding examples of Administration misrepresentation:
Senator Ervin, for example, was induced by the Justice Department to
sponsor the D.C. Crime bill, after being assured that it only reformed the
court system in the capital, only to find out too late that the 439 pages
contained "literally a garbage pail of some of the most repressive,
nearsighted, intolerant, unfair and vindictive legislation that the Senate
has ever been presented."' 5
The so-called "no-knock" and "preventive detention" proposals were
120Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1968);
Schwartz, supra n.116, at 497.
M H. ScHwArTz, ACLU REPORTS: A REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFrrs OF
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE-1972 at 5 (1973).
:m Id.
123 Id. at 11, 12.
l Id. at 7.
125 Harris, Reflections: The New h4stice, TaE NEW YoRgER, Margh 25, 1972 .4t 44,
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a part of this pail. Senator Ervin and others argued both the practical and
constitutional objections to both, but the ears of the majority were cocked
to the uncertain fate in November for those who opposed such measures.
When other arguments failed and Ervin's constitutional remonstrances
were heard, the pro argument was altered. The argument stressed that the
law would not affect Congressional districts throughout the United States,
but, was just an experiment within the District of Columbia. For those
who succumbed to such arguments in regard to the welfare of the 80%
Black population of the District of Columbia, they soon found that the
same "no-knock" proposal had been made applicable to all federal
jurisdictions in legislation to be enacted 90 days later.'" In fact, the
District of Columbia is about the only place in the nation where
the no-knock breakins are not occurring. Washington's Chief of Police is
quite a pragmatist. At first, he developed a four-foot-long solid steel
battering ram, equipped with handles for four policemen to swing it 
at
one time.' 7 However, second thoughts evolved when it was noted that
gambling establishments installed metal doors and converted their working
papers to soluble stock. Further, the chief lawyer for the D.C. Police
Department reported that the use of no-knock may increase the possibility
of injuries to both police and occupants. "It's most effective from a safety
viewpoint to announce who we are," he explained. "Generally, we don't
need no-knock," he added.1
28 Elsewhere in the nation, where the no-knock
entries have been authorized by the subsequently enacted Drug Abuse
Act,2 there have now been so many reports of mistaken breakins 
at
the wrong house, that it is now altogether possible that "No-Knock" may
be the first of the law and order statutes to be repealed.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 became law just three
128 The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1970).
2 Washington Post, March 16, 1971, at B1.
1.2 Meyer, No-Knock Entries Limited, Washington Post, July 6, 1973, at Cl.
129 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 879
(1970).
"Preventive Detention" has shared a similar, limited implementation 
in the
District of Columbia. Challenged at the time of its enactment as both 
a denial of
the presumption of innocence, it was soon reported that the procedures 
established
under the law were too cumbersome to merit frequent use. However, when 
challenged
by reporters as to why the Administration was pressing to make it applicable 
to other
jurisdictions, Justice Department spokesmen frankly admitted that it was their belief
that the District Courts were "too liberal" and they wished to try it in other 
areas. In
recent months, Administration spokesmen have been quoted in conflicting 
positions.
In December, 1972, a Justice Department statement indicated that the Justice 
Depart-
ment would just as soon forget about preventive detention for other jurisdictions,
because of the unsatisfactory D.C. experience. However, in July, 1973, the Department
reported that it had doubled its usage in two months, and expected to expedite 
its
further revival.
See Friedman, Administration Shutting Door on "No-Knock," Charlotte 
Observer,
Dec. 17, 1972; Meyer, Pretrial Detention Up Here-Rate Doubles in Two Months
Under '70 Act, Washington Post, July 2, 1973, at B1,
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weeks before the November elections in 1972. On final passage, it clearedthe Senate unanimously, and in the House only 26 Representatives voted
their opposition.130 This occurred, despite Senator Kennedy's earlier
charge that one section, the "Special Dangerous Offender" provision, was
so loosely worded that it might be more aptly applied to civil rights and
peace activists than to so-called organized crime; 31 and, a well-publicized
plea from a 3-man House Judiciary Committee Minority Report that
"the bill takes great chunks out of the Bill of Rights.'-' 2
Unlike the District of Columbia Crime bill, at least 25% of which
was devoted to progressive improvements in the administration of justicein the District, there are no sections of the Organized Crime Control Act
meriting civil liberties support. The "Special Dangerous Offender"
section,133 which in some ways was similar to an equally dangerous
"Multiple Offender" section of the District of Columbia bill, provides for
a trial judge to mete out a 25-year prison term for a recidivist foundguilty on an immediate charge, which normally would carry only ayear's count for a simple felony. Under the sentencing, and, in reachingjudgment, the court hears "all information" against the defendant,including information withheld from the defendant for national security
reasons. Further, should the court reject the "information" and render
only the year's sentence which the jury acted on, the government can
appeal to higher courts to "increase the sentence."
Another section of the Act selected as an example of the repressive
nature of the law, not only undermines the historic meaning andprotections of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, but
nullifies the 80-year-old Supreme Court Counselman rule,3 4 by allowinggrants of either "use" or "transactional" immunity.'3 5 The government
has utilized the measure in a number of instances in the past twoyears. This provision has unfortunately been sustained by the Burger
Court in Kastigar v. United States.'3 6
FUTURE REPRESSION
In the full context of the foregoing, this paper is concluded with an
analysis of what is deemed here to be the most repressive legislative
130 116 CONG. REC. 35363 (1970).
131 Remarks by Senator Kennedy, 116 CONG. REC. 847 (1970).
'32 Representatives John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and Win. F. Ryan, 116 CONG.
REc. 181-196 (1970).
'33 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
134 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). A person shall not be compelled,when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to
show that he himself had committed a crime.
'35 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
136 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972)("Use" and "derivative use" immunity is all that is required by the fifth amendment).
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proposal to have been submitted to Congress in 25 years: the Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1973.137 Under the guise of long overdue reform
of the Federal Criminal Code, President Nixon has submitted legislation
which would in the author's opinion turn back the clock of justice
on a wide range of progressive judicial precedents and legislative
enactments in the area of criminal law.
Notwithstanding Watergate, the legislation is quietly moving through
the United States Senate's Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law and
Procedures, since introduction on March 27, 1973. With practically no
press or other media coverage to date,138 a score of hearings has been
held, and the sponsors have expressed hope for speedy Senate approval. 39
Hearings on the identical measure in the House' 4° have not started, but
the bill has been co-sponsored by all but one of the 16 Republicans
comprising the minority contingent of the House Judiciary Committee.
The omnibus proposal is extremely complex. When combined with
an earlier draft' 4 ' which was introduced on the opening day of the 93rd
Congress, the bill runs 874 pages. The need for reform of the Criminal
Code is manifest. Originally, in 1966, Congress established a National
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws under the chair-
manship of California's former Governor Edmund G. Brown. Five years
and a new Administration later, in 1971, this Commission submitted its
final report, which was generally viewed by legal scholars as a significant
advancement over nearly 200 years of haphazard evolution of the
criminal law. Thereafter, President Nixon assigned Attorney General
John Mitchell to review and revise the recommendation for submission
as Administration legislation. After the resignation of Mitchell, the
revisions were completed under Attorney General Richard Kliendienst
and presented to the Congress. President Nixon's remarks at the
presentation to Congress of the new criminal code included this comment:
"There are those who say that law and order are code words for repression
and bigotry ... This is dangerous nonsense. Law and order are code
words for goodness and decency.., the only way to attack crime in.
America is the way crime attacks our people-without pity."' Selected
below are 14 features of the proposed revision of the Criminal Code
which, depending on the viewpoint, might be characterized as the
137Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973, S.1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
138 Hearings on S.1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
139 Senators Roman Hruska (R-Neb.) and John L. McClelland (D-Ark.), see 119
CoNo. REC. 5777 (Daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973).
140 H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 119 CoNo. REc. 2118 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1973).
141 S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
142 119 CONG. REC. 5780-81 (1973); N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1973, § IV, at 3, col. 1.
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"goodness and decency" or "repression and bigotry" sections of the
pending legislation.
RESTORATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY"
S. 1400 and a separate version which deals exclusively with the
Death Penalty, S. 1401, sidesteps the 1972 Supreme Court decision which
held the extreme penalty to be unconstitutional, as applied.144 In an effort
to circumvent the Court's ruling, the bill makes executions mandatory for
certain crimes, in the absence of "mitigating" factors-with the burden of
proof on the defendant-and the existence of "aggravating" factors. No
provision is made for appellate review. A little noticed clause would
permit the judge who might mete out the sentence to determine if material
shall be withheld from the defense for reasons of "national security."
REVIVAL OF THE SMITH ACT' 45
The bill provides for the restoration of this McCarthy era witch
hunt law, which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in
Yates v. United States in 1957.14 The proposal provides for 15 years in
prison and a $100,000 fine for mere advocacy or membership in an
organization that allegedly calls for revolutionary change in the United
States "or any state or local government, as speedily as circumstances
permit... at some future time."
"LEADING" A RIOT
147
This section redrafts the Anti-Riot Act of 1968. As rewritten, the
bill would provide for a 3-year prison sentence and a $25,000 fine for
the "movement of a person across a state" boundary, or, for even the
use of the mails or the telephone "in the course of the planning or
promotion" of a "riot." And, a "riot" is redefined as "an assemblage of
five" which "creates a grave danger" to "property." This is an improve-
ment-it took only 3 people to constitute a riot under the 1968 Act.
143 CCRA 1973 § 2401.
'44 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
145 The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1940).
146 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Here the Supreme Court, per Justice
Harlan, held that when the charge of conspiring to organize the Communist Party of
the United States with intent to cause the violent overthrow of the government was
barred by the statute of limitations but was submitted to the jury along with the
charge of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the government, the convictions
could not be upheld when it could not be determined upon which charge the
defendants had been convicted.
147 CCRA 1973 § 1801.
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SECRECY'"
It is worthy to note that the Administration was busy rewriting the
laws under which Dr. Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were tried, months
before the "dirty tricks" burglaries gave the Court cause for acquittal.
From the following it can be seen that the Administration believed that
under present law the jury might have found Ellsberg and Russo innocent
on the grounds that the Pentagon Papers should not have been kept
secret from the public. S. 1400 provides for 3 years in prison and a
$25,000 fine for any federal employee who "communicates... Classified
information" to an unauthorized recipient, even if the information was
"improperly classified at the time." And (in a pointed attack upon the
New York Times, Washington Post, the Unitarian-Universalist press,
Jack Anderson, et al) the bill provides for a 7-year sentence and a
$50,000 fine for any person who receives "information relating to national
defense" and "fails to deliver it promptly" back to government authorities.
The most frightening section of the proposed legislation concerns
a redefinition of "espionage" as one of the "aggravating" circumstances
under which the death penalty would be reinstated. By holding that
disclosed "information relating to the national defense ... may be used, to
the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States."' 149 Dr. Ellsberg
or the publisher of the New York Times could have been convicted and
sentenced to death under this new provision.
WIRETAPPING15°
This reaffirms, without qualification, the 1968 law permitting the
President to wiretap domestic activities which he deems to be a "danger to
the structure" of the government. In so doing, the legislation ignores the
stinging rebuke rendered the Administration in United States District
Court 51 which held that such authority was subject to a court showing
of "probable cause," under the strictures of the fourth amendment.
Further, S. 1400 proposes to expand the Attorney General's authority
to wiretap alleged offenses related to first amendment protected actions. It
also reaffirms the 1968 proviso for 48-hour "emergency" wiretaps without
prior court approval. And, still unknown to the public, although slipped
through under the deceptive title of "Conforming Amendments" to the
District of Columbia Crime Act, the Administration proposes to perpetuate
the ominous adjunct to the entire wiretapping scheme, by ordering
148 CCRA 1973 §§ 1124, 1121,1123. Section 1124 would establish federal control of
information flow, making it a felony for a federal employee to give "classified infor-
mation" to an unauthorized recipient and precludes the defense of improper classifi-
cation. Section 1123 would proscribe the mishandling of national defense information.
149 CCRA 1973 § 1121.
150 CCRA 1973 ch. 206 § 312 9(d).
151 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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telephone company workers, landlords, custodians, building superintend-
ents, etc., to cooperate "forthwith" and "unobtrusively" with the F.B.I.
and police "to accomplish the interception ... of a wire or oral communi-
cation" within homes or offices. 52
CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 5 3
Another throwback to the McCarthy era is the bill's proposal for
increasing the penalties for those who refuse to cooperate with
Congressional Committees, such as HUAC, HISC, or the Eastland
counterpart in the Senate. Hereafter, the price tag for unsuccessful first
amendment challenges of such inquisitorial bodies would be 3 years in
prison, not 1; and, a $25,000 fine, not $1,000.
DEMONSTRATIONS"5
Virtually every kind of civil rights, peace and other protest action
would be threatened with severe penalties under a series of vaguely
drafted infringements upon the right of assembly, with penalties ranging
from 5 days and $500 fines up to life imprisonment and a $100,000
fine. For example, under the "Sabotage" section, 155 an overt act could
include interference with the delivery of defense materials of the United
States or an "associate nation" (South Vietnam, Cambodia, etc.).
Another provision entitled "Obstructing Military Recruitment or
Induction,"' 5 6 could include such offenses as sit-ins or mass picket lines
at induction centers or at campus military recruitment drives, with
penalties ranging up to 15 years in prison and a $100,000 fine. Still
another, entitled "Inciting or Aiding Mutiny, Insubordination or
Desertion,"' 57 appears to be aimed at GI underground papers, rank-and-
file peace and civil liberties organizations of military personnel, and
GI coffee houses, among other objectives.
152 CCRA 1973 ch. 206 § 3129(d).
'53 CCRA 1973 § 1333.
154 CCRA 1973 § 1116. Section 1116 deals with the obstruction of military recruit-
ment or induction and makes the creation of a physical interference, the use of a
threat of force, or the encitement of either a class "D" felony.
M CCRA 1973 § 1111. Under this section a person is guilty of an offense if he has
the intent to "impair, interfere with, or obstruct the ability of the United States or an
associate nation to prepare for or engage in war or defense activities. .. " and commits
an act which is listed as a type of sabotage.
15 CCRA 1973 § 1116. To violate this section a defendant would have to have the
specific intent to "hinder, interfere with, or obstruct, the recruitment, conscription, or
induction of a person into the armed forces of the United States..."
157 CCRA 1973 § 1117. This section as it is written in S.1400 gives a broad proscription
against the inciting, aiding, abetting, counseling or commanding of a person who
mutinies, is insubordinate, or deserts the armed forces of the United States.
[Vol. 7:2
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ENTRAPMENT...
This part of S. 1400 so limits the definition of what constitutes the
"unlawful entrapment" defense as to substantially modify existing case
law. The bill places the burden on the defendant to prove that he was
"unlawfully entrapped," even though the evidence reveals that an
undercover agent provocateur had employed "deception," provided "a
facility or an opportunity," or engaged in "mere solicitation which would
not induce an ordinary law-abiding person to commit an offense."
OBSCENITY 59
This title of the bill is patently offensive to the first amendment. It
would make criminals of all persons who in any way disseminate any
material describing sexual intercourse or depicting nudity. Even good faith
belief that the material in question is not obscene is specifically ruled out
as a defense. The proposal would give legislative sanction to recent
Supreme Court decisions in this general area,160 and offers a convenient
vehicle for political censorship as well. To appreciate just how reactionary
a trend is being pressed here, it should be noted that as recently as 1970,
the 18-member Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, established
by Congress and named by President Johnson, recommended the repeal
of all federal, state, and local laws prohibiting the sale, exhibition or
distribution of sexual materials to consenting adults. 16'
INSANITY' 62
The provision in this area returns the law to a primitive state which
was abandoned over a century ago. In effect, the Administration's
proposal would wipe out the defense of insanity, since the defendant's
defense-whether he was insane or not-would be, to quote the
President: "only if the defendant did not know what he was doing...
the only question considered germane in a murder case, for example,
would be whether the defendant knew whether he was pulling the trigger
15 CCRA 1973 § 531. Compare Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967),
with Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
159 CCRA 1973 § 1851. This section uses as its criterion for obscenity, "... a close-up
of a human genital" or "explicit representation or detailed description of sexual
intercourse." Section 1851 (d) excludes the defense that the person reasonably believed
that the material was not obscene.
160 California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Pub. L. No. 90-100, Report, September 1970. For reasons given for its general
recommendation refer to pages 52-60.
161 COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY REPORT (1970).
162 CCRA 1973 § 502. See also M'Naghten's case, 10 CI. F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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of a gun."'6 Would Mr. Nixon thereby steer unequivocally sick people
to jail or execution, rather than mental hospitals?
CIVIL RIGHTS'"'
This section is proposed to provide only a minor misdemeanor
punishment of 1 year to public officials or private parties who injure,
threaten or intimidate another person in the free exercise of his rights
under the Constitution. In addition, it would eliminate any punishment
for those who use threats of economic retaliation against those attempting
to enjoy such rights.
MARIJUANA1 o5
S. 1400 provides for 1 year in prison and a $10,000 fine for mere
possession of minor amounts of marijuana for personal use; and, increases
this amount to 3 years and a $25,000 fine, if the possession is detected
when arriving or departing from a trip out of the country.
POLICE FORCElU6
While this proposed reform of the Criminal Code rejects effective
national control of handguns, as had been recommended by the original
National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, the bill
sanctions the use of deadly force by a police officer to prevent escape
of a person arrested for any crime, however petty, and without regard
to the danger to the life of others. In fact, a whole catalogue of
justifications is written into the legislation to protect law officers from
effective prosecution from charges of using unnecessary force. The record
is manifest of killings, under color of law, at both federal and local
levels, particularly against residents of the nation's ghettos; but the
Administration's "Reform" Act of 1973 pays no heed.
THEFT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 7
The "Espionage" section discussed above becomes even more drastic
under novel redefinitions where "theft" is made applicable to theft of
"information." This is accomplished by expanding the definition
of "property" to include "intellectual ... information." It can readily
be seen how such a statute could be used against the press by any federal
bureaucrat who wished to suppress embarrassing information against
governmental wrongdoing.
163 Statement by President Richard M. Nixon, March 14, 1973.
164 CCRA 1973 §§ 1501, 1502.
15 CCRA 1973 § 1822.
166 CCRA 1973 § 521.
167 CCR.A 1973 § 111.
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CONCLUSION
As this is written, there are hopeful signs that the obsequious role of
the legislative branch in the law and order years since 1968, may be
coming to an end. However, this is far from certain, and the injurious
legislative enactments of 1968 and 1970 remain without serious challenge.
Finally, the repressive features of the Criminal Code Reform Act of
1973 can be defeated, if, the public is alerted in time. Although not
publicized in the general press, a number of prominent individuals have
written or testified against S. 1400.168 Their statements of authority can
be of great help in the educational tasks ahead on this issue.
168 See Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before a Subcomm. of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); See also Schwartz, The
Proposed Federal Criminal Code. The Administration's Bill S.1400, 13 CalM. L. REP.
3265 (1973) in which Louis B. Schwartz, former Director of the National Commission
of the Reform of Federal Laws, has analyzed the CCRA 1973 in great detail.
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